

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE PROCESS OF EURASIAN UNIFICATION

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ABSTRACT

This article seeks to open a new perspective on geopolitical developments in the European and Eurasian regions. As in recent years (especially after 2020, and even more rapidly after 2022, the year marking the beginning of the war between Russia and Ukraine), geopolitical conflicts have shown that there are major tensions within the global power system, this paper proposes a possible hypothesis regarding the future evolution of the balance of power in the global geopolitical system. The central idea of the article is that U.S. hegemony is increasingly subject to pressures of disintegration and that this hegemony will most likely be replaced by a Eurasianist system in which the Russia-China alliance will ultimately connect with the structure of the European Union, along two geopolitical axes opposed to Washington: the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis and the Moscow-Beijing axis.

Keywords: Eurasianism, the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis, the Moscow-Beijing axis, the European Union, Rhenish Europe.

1. INTRODUCTION

A geopolitical article is an account of a historical moment for a given geopolitical unit. In the following lines, we invite the reader to go through a series of ideas that we noted down approximately seven years ago. At the time, these ideas seemed bold or even risky; today, when we have already had four years of war in Ukraine and, for several weeks now, a new conflagration in Iran (the second in less than a year – let us not forget that in June 2025 there was a crisis episode manifested in a 12-day war between Israel and the United States, on the one hand, and Iran, on the other), of an intensity and geopolitical drama not seen before, these ideas – written down prior to 2022 (the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, in fact a U.S.-Russian conflict waged through the proxy in Kyiv) – have gained even greater relevance.

We will not leave the reader merely to “contemplate” what was written in 2019. We will intervene along the way to supplement where necessary, to nuance, to reinforce, or to refute certain statements. Broadly speaking, the main idea of the 2019 material remains valid. It “anticipated” a geopolitical evolution around a Paris-Berlin-Moscow-type axis, to which Beijing was also added. Today, this (potential) axis has strengthened. We already speak of BRICS, of the Shanghai Cooperation

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Organization, of a Turkey that is increasingly less compatible with American interests in the Gulf – especially in light of Israel’s interests – of an India which, despite an apparently balanced approach, still lies within the geopolitical sphere of BRICS, and of a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that seems to be an isolated mini-continent within an increasingly hesitant American geopolitics in Eurasia. All these elements have since become clearer and continue to do so. We will attempt to insert them in their proper place, with the appropriate commentary. We ask the reader to excuse this “creation” born in two stages. Geopolitics, a discipline concerned with the shifting dynamics of power at the global level, never starts from scratch. The past is both its father and its mother. Therefore, let us begin as well with the picture of 2019, in order to continue with that of the present day.

The idea from which we depart is that there exists a trend toward an “objective” geopolitical unification – dictated by geography – but also a subjective one (driven by the desire to emerge from under what until recently was the almost unquestioned tutelage of American strategic dominance, through well-known global instruments: the dollar, SWIFT, NATO, etc.) at the Eurasian level, with two main engines: to the west, the EU; to the east, the Russia-China alliance. The reader may be surprised by the previous assertion. Is the EU a “Eurasianist” actor? In what way? With what antecedents? How exactly, as of 2026? These and other questions will shape the course of our updated article. We hope to be as objective and as neutral as possible in this endeavor, although complete axiological neutrality, in geopolitics as in other related areas of the human sciences, remains only a noble aspiration.

The European Union does not equate to Europe, which can be translated as meaning that it does not “exhaust” the concept of Europe. This statement is nothing remarkable; it is simply a factual reality. Not only does the EU not include all European states, but within the current Union there are also numerous forces seeking to reform the model of integration. Such forces have manifested themselves, as could be seen following the European Parliament elections of 1999, as well as those of 2024, both in states from the so-called “peripheral” zone of the EU (Hungary and Poland, which are leaders of the so-called Visegrád Group), and in major EU states such as Italy and France, and – to a lesser but still significant extent – in Germany. Europe and the EU are clearly going through a less-than-favorable period. For this reason, it is worthwhile to briefly review several geopolitical elements in order to identify possible future directions of development for the continent, as well as its strengths and weaknesses.

2. GEOPOLITICAL UNITY OR INTERNAL ECONOMIC DISSENSIONS?

A united Europe is a romantic dream dating back to the 19th century and even earlier, but it was only during the interwar period that the process of unification had both a plan and an actor who assumed it. That actor was Germany, and the definition

of a German Europe at the time limited its sphere of action to Western and Central Europe, up to the boundary of the Russian Orthodox space⁵⁰. In the terms of a geopolitical thinker such as Jordis von Lohausen, this was the so-called *Fränkisch Europa* (Frankish Europe), which we also find today in the famous “Franco-German couple”, to which was added – for obvious reasons – an eastern periphery supplying raw materials⁵¹. This “small” Europe, lacking geopolitical substance and strategic vitality, stands in contrast to the so-called *Eurasian Europe: a Very Great Europe* stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok, envisioned by visionary geopoliticians such as Lohausen, Jean Thiriart, or even the highly atypical German national-bolshevik figure Ernst Niekisch⁵².

The Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok inherently contains the development of a geopolitical concept advanced as early as the beginning of the 20th century by French strategists, as a response to the rising power of the United States: the famous (though still relatively under-discussed) “Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis”, conceived by the French – sensitive to the geopolitical advance of the Anglo-Saxon world – as a counterweight to the United States and its counterpart, England⁵³.

Today, the so-called Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis, although it sometimes manifests itself potentially, remains more intuited than realized, and most geopolitical analyses tend to ignore it. However, here is a case in which it is nevertheless invoked today, in the context of the Gulf war between the United States-Israel and Iran:

“Ukraine and Israel are two frontier states located in the Rimland, if we refer to Anglo-American geopolitical doctrines. This space can be divided into a European Rimland, in order to prevent an understanding on a European scale along the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis, and a Near Eastern Rimland, in order to prevent an understanding along

⁵⁰ The reader may consult the well-known speech by the Reich Minister of Economics, Walther Funk, concerning the model for the reorganization of the European economy envisioned by the Nazi elite of the time. The speech dates from July 25, 1940. Unfortunately, the translation suffers in terms of clarity of ideas: http://www.eufacts.org/ro/roots/06_economic_reorganization_europe.html?fclid=IwAR3ovNSw6lc2EfaDcyFDNU3xe0w12_Ww8bm-fmTLaFH8-WcvCXc7TMxrKw.

⁵¹ Today, a leading Romanian commentator and specialist, Adrian Severin, refers to this Franco-German pair and its Europe as the “Rhenish Europe”, see Adrian Severin, *România și interesul național românesc în contextul dezordinii mondiale actuale. Proiect geo-politic [Romania and the Romanian National Interest in the Context of the Current Global Disorder. A Geopolitical Project]*, Bucharest, Oscar Print Publishing House, 2025, p. 254.

⁵² See Jean Thiriart, “Interview with Jean Thiriart, Part 1”, in *Counter Currents*, September 26, 2010, Available at: <https://www.counter-currents.com/2010/09/interview-with-jean-thiriart-1/>, Accessed on February 21, 2026.

⁵³ “In 1903, two colonels from the French intelligence services drafted a report on the growing power of the United States of America. They concluded that it possessed great industrial, agricultural, and commercial strength and that it would dominate the world in the years to come. The only way to oppose an American hegemony (according to the authors of this report) was to establish an integrated alliance comprising France, Germany, and Russia (therefore, a Europe stretching from Brest to Vladivostok...)”, in Herve Le Bideau, „Înapoi la visul spulberat al lui Nicolae al II-lea” [“Back to Nicholas II’s shattered dream”], in *Estica*, July 13, 2017, Available at: <https://www.estica.ro/article/inapoi-lavisulspulberat-al-lui-nicolae-al-ii-lea/>, Accessed on February 21, 2026.

the Iran-Russia and Iran-China axes. Iran occupies a strategic position in Western Asia, serving as a link between the Near East, Central Asia, and South Asia. Iran has access to the Caspian Sea to the north and to the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman to the south, extensions of the Indian Ocean. According to United States geopolitical strategy, control over Iran would allow the expansion of the Near Eastern Rimland into Asia and the weakening of the Shiite world⁵⁴.

But the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis has an interesting complement – and a competitor – in the Moscow-Beijing axis, which appears to be steering current events in the geopolitical space of the so-called Heartland, a region that seems more contested than ever today.

Here is an analysis that highlights the competition between Beijing's geopolitical plans (supported by Moscow) in the Heartland area (through the well-known Belt and Road Initiative) and Washington's alternative plans, which are far more limited in scope:

“The week of February 4–10, 2026, crystallized, in just a few days, a transformation that had already been underway. On the one hand, Tokayev and Sharif signed agreements in Islamabad for the Trans-Afghan corridor, integrating it into the BRICS network. On the other hand, Vance signed a strategic partnership in Baku and launched TRIPP as the Western node of the Middle Corridor.

The two architectures are not symmetrical. TRIPP is a targeted project, politically sophisticated, which links the region to American commercial interests. The BRICS network is a distributed system, broader and more complex, aimed at building a trade infrastructure independent of the West.

For Europe, the message is twofold and concerning. Washington shows that it still knows how to exercise its influence through economics and infrastructure, but it does so for its own interests, building routes that serve American energy diversification and access to critical minerals in Central Asia – priorities that do not necessarily align with European ones. BRICS, on the other hand, is building a world in which goods, energy, and capital can circulate without passing through Western financial and logistical infrastructures.

⁵⁴ “L’Ukraine et Israël sont deux États-fronts situés dans le Rimland si l’on se réfère aux doctrines géopolitiques anglo-américaines. On peut décomposer cet espace en un Rimland européen afin de torpiller une entente à l’échelle européenne sur l’axe Paris-Berlin-Moscou et un Rimland proche-oriental afin de torpiller une entente sur les axes Iran-Russie et Iran-Chine. L’Iran a une position stratégique situé en Asie occidentale et charnière entre le Proche-Orient, l’Asie centrale et l’Asie du Sud. L’Iran a accès à la mer Caspienne au nord et au golfe Persique et à la mer d’Oman au sud, extensions de l’Océan Indien. Selon la stratégie géopolitique des États-Unis, le contrôle de l’Iran permettrait d’élargir le Rimland proche-oriental vers l’Asie et affaiblir le monde Chiite.”, in Pierre-Emmanuel Thomann, “Guerre Américano-israélienne contre l’Iran et le Monde Multipolaire: la Question américaine” [“The US-Israeli War against Iran and the Multipolar World: The American Question”], in *Eurocontinent*, March 8, 2026, Available at: <https://www.eurocontinent.eu/guerre-americano-israelienne-contre-liran-et-le-monde-multipolaire-la-questionamericaine/>, Accessed on March 10, 2026. We will note that most of the analyses on the platform cited above align themselves with this geopolitical interpretation of the need to oppose American hegemony in the world and in Europe through a Euro-Russian axis.

An old geopolitical saying held that ‘whoever controls the seas controls trade’. In the 21st century, the updated version is whoever controls the corridors – rail, energy, digital – controls global value chains. And in this game, the Caucasus and Central Asia are no longer peripheral: they are the center⁵⁵.

The game in the “heart” of the Heartland, now centered on the war in Iran, is a struggle for supremacy in Eurasia. Clearly, the European Union will have to consider the outcome of the dispute between Washington and the Moscow-Beijing axis in order to position itself, in turn, in relation to its broader eastern neighborhood, which we consider to be its appropriate geopolitical counterpart – namely, a BRICS-type synergy.

Thus, a “united Europe” may emerge either in the limited dimension of the current EU, or with the perspective of opening toward the Eurasian Heartland – considered by English and American theorists to be the geopolitical quintessence of the world⁵⁶ – for a possible interpenetration with China’s vast accumulation of economic and civilizational power, which could enhance Eurasian synergy.

As for ourselves, we have already ventured to suggest that, following NATO’s unacknowledged – yet not denied – failure in Ukraine, the United States may also face a defeat on the Middle Eastern front in the current conflict with Iran⁵⁷. The U.S.-Israel

⁵⁵ „Săptămâna 4–10 februarie 2026 a cristalizat în câteva zile o transformare care era în curs de ani de zile. Pe de o parte, Tokaev și Sharif semnează la Islamabad acordurile pentru coridorul transafgan, integrându-l în rețeaua BRICS. Pe de altă parte, Vance semnează la Baku parteneriatul strategic și lansează TRIPP ca nod occidental al Middle Corridor.

Cele două arhitecturi nu sunt simetrice. TRIPP este un proiect punctual, sofisticat politic, care leagă regiunea de interesele comerciale americane. Rețeaua BRICS este un sistem distribuit, mai vast și mai complex, care urmărește construirea unei infrastructuri comerciale globale independente de Occident.

Pentru Europa, mesajul este dublu și îngrijorător. Washington arată că mai știe să își exercite influența prin economie și infrastructură, dar o face pentru propriile interese, construind rute care servesc diversificarea energetică americană și accesul la mineralele critice din Asia Centrală, ceea ce nu corespunde neapărat priorităților europene. BRICS, în schimb, construiește o lume în care mărfurile, energia și capitalurile pot circula fără să treacă prin infrastructurile financiare și logistice occidentale.

Vechea zicală geopolitică spunea că «cine controlează mările controlează comerțul». În secolul XXI, versiunea actualizată este: cine controlează coridoarele – feroviare, energetice, digitale – controlează lanțurile valorice globale. Și în acest joc, Caucazul și Asia Centrală nu mai sunt periferie: ele sunt centrul.”, in Margherita Furlan, „Războiul coridoarelor: din Caucaz până în Asia Centrală, Washingtonul și BRICS își dispută rutele viitorului” [“The Battle for Corridors: From the Caucasus to Central Asia, Washington and the BRICS Nations Vie for Control of Future Routes”], in *Estica*, March 17, 2026, Available at: <https://www.estica.ro/article/razboiulcoridoarelordincaucazpanainasiacentrala-washingtonul-si-brics-isi-disputa-rutele-viitorului/>, Accessed on March 18, 2026.

⁵⁶ The best-known geopoliticians of the Heartland are the Englishman Halford John Mackinder, with his 1904 work *The Geographical Pivot of History*, then the American Halford Mackinder with *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (1919), and, more recently, the influential American strategist of Polish origin, Zbigniew Brzezinski, with *The Grand Chessboard*, whose original edition dates from 1997.

⁵⁷ Cristi Pantelimon, “Le précédent iranien. L’échec des États-Unis en Ukraine signifie également la perte du Moyen-Orient” [“The Iranian precedent. The U.S. failure in Ukraine also means the loss of the Middle East”], in *Forum des résistants européens Euro-Synergies*, March 11, 2026, Available at: <http://eurosnergies.hautetfort.com/archive/2026/03/11/le-precedent-iranien-l-echec-des-etats-unis-enukrainesignifieegalement-l.html>, Accessed on March 12, 2026.

conflict with Iran, the latest in the series following the reannexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 (the first step in Russia's Eurasian reconquest, increasingly supported today by China), is no less a conflict between the United States and the Moscow-Beijing axis and, we dare say, an undeclared one with the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis (the two axes thus share a common point: Moscow). This is evident *прежде всего* from the clear support that Moscow and Beijing provide to Tehran, something that has not escaped analysts:

“Strikes on Iranian infrastructure, particularly the port of Bandar Abbas, threaten to collapse the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), on which Russia and China rely to bypass maritime routes controlled by the West.

Moscow and Beijing have moved from being diplomatic allies to becoming ‘technological anchors’, supplying Iran with advanced S-400 air defense systems, Su-35 fighter jets, and the BeiDou-3 navigation system to counter Western stealth and jamming capabilities.

If Russia and China fail to move beyond technology transfers toward active deterrence, they risk a ‘credibility deficit’ that could signal the failure of the multipolar world order and deter potential partners from the Global South (...)

By providing the ‘connective tissue’ of Iran's defense – particularly high-resolution imagery and jam-resistant targeting systems – these allies (Russia and China – author's note) have ensured that Iran does not fight in isolation. Ultimately, the survival of Iran's revolutionary government is tied to the viability of the INSTC corridor and the energy corridors of the Belt and Road Initiative. The true measure of this conflict is whether this discreet infusion of strategic technology can preserve the vital bridgehead of Russia and China against Western military pressure.

However, in the high-stakes world of geopolitics, perception is often as powerful as military force. If Moscow and Beijing allow a key node such as Tehran to be dismantled without a visible escalation of support, they risk a ‘credibility deficit’ that could alienate other potential partners from the Global South.

There is a critical inflection point at which technological anchoring is no longer sufficient. For the Kremlin and the leadership in Zhongnanhai, the conflict has reached a stage where passive support risks being interpreted as strategic paralysis. If the Western-led coalition succeeds in degrading Iran's essential infrastructure despite these technological injections, the narrative of a ‘multipolar alternative’ collapses.

No regional power will opt for a security architecture that fails at its first major test. If Russia and China do not move beyond the role of suppliers toward more assertive forms of deterrence – whether through offensive electronic warfare deployments or explicit naval demonstrations – they risk being perceived as unreliable guarantors.

Although U.S.-China dynamics are currently strained by tariff wars and disruptions in raw-material supply chains, and Russia remains focused on the Ukrainian theater, none of them can afford the *سقوط* of Tehran. A collapse of Iran would represent a definitive checkmate against the Eurasian land bridge.

Consequently, we are approaching a ‘minimum credibility threshold’. To maintain their status as viable counterweights to the West, Moscow and Beijing must ultimately reduce the gap between supporting Iranian resistance and actively protecting it. By failing to take this ‘extra step’, they would not only cede the Middle East to Western hegemony but also signal to the rest of the world that the Russo-Chinese security umbrella is purely transactional and lacks the firmness required for direct confrontation.

The strikes of 2026 against Iran mark more than a simple regional escalation; they threaten the very architecture of a multipolar Eurasia.

Although some analysts interpret the lack of direct military intervention by Russia or China as abandonment, this interpretation overlooks a deeper strategic reality. Moscow and Beijing have moved from the status of diplomatic partners to that of ‘technological anchors’. However, the conflict has reached a point where continued passive support risks being interpreted as strategic paralysis.

Therefore, Moscow and Beijing must move beyond mere risk avoidance and carefully calibrate the next phase of escalation in order to prevent the total collapse of their regional credibility”⁵⁸.

⁵⁸ „Loviturile asupra infrastructurii iraniene, în special asupra portului Bandar Abbas, amenință să ducă la colapsul Coridorului Internațional de Transport Nord-Sud (INSTC) și al Inițiativei Belt and Road (BRI), pe care Rusia și China se bazează pentru a ocoli rutele maritime controlate de Occident.

Moscova și Beijingul au trecut de la statutul de aliați diplomatici la cel de «ancore tehnologice», furnizând Iranului sisteme avansate de apărare antiaeriană S-400, avioane de vânătoare Su-35 și sistemul de navigație BeiDou-3, pentru a contracara capacitățile occidentale de stealth și bruiaj.

Dacă Rusia și China nu reușesc să treacă dincolo de transferurile de tehnologie către o descurajare activă, riscă un «deficit de credibilitate» care ar putea semnala eșecul ordinii mondiale multipolare și ar putea îndepărta potențiali parteneri din Sudul Global (...)

Prin furnizarea de «tesutului conjunctiv» al apărării Iranului – în special imagini de înaltă rezoluție și sisteme de țintire rezistente la bruiaj – acești aliați (Rusia și China – n. C. P.) s-au asigurat că Iranul nu luptă în izolare. În ultimă instanță, supraviețuirea guvernului revoluționar iranian este legată de viabilitatea coridorului INSTC și a coridoarelor energetice ale Inițiativei Belt and Road. Adevărata măsură a acestui conflict este dacă această infuzie discretă de tehnologie strategică poate păstra capul de pod vital al Rusiei și Chinei împotriva presiunii militare occidentale.

Totuși, în lumea geopolitică cu mize ridicate, percepția este adesea la fel de puternică precum forța militară. Dacă Moscova și Beijingul permit ca un nod-cheie precum Teheranul să fie dezmembrat fără o escaladare vizibilă a sprijinului, riscă un «deficit de credibilitate» care ar putea îndepărta alți potențiali parteneri din Sudul Global.

Există un punct critic de inflexiune în care ancorarea tehnologică nu mai este suficientă. Pentru Kremlin și pentru conducerea de la Zhongnanhai, conflictul a ajuns într-o fază în care sprijinul pasiv riscă să fie interpretat drept paralizie strategică. Dacă coaliția condusă de Occident reușește să degradeze infrastructura esențială a Iranului în ciuda acestor injecții tehnologice, narațiunea unei «alternative multipolare» se prăbușește.

Nicio putere regională nu va opta pentru o arhitectură de securitate care eșuează la primul său test major. Dacă Rusia și China nu trec dincolo de rolul de furnizor către forme mai ferme de descurajare – fie prin desfășurări ofensive de război electronic, fie prin demonstrații navale explicite – riscă să fie percepute ca garanți nesiguri.

Deși dinamica dintre SUA și China este în prezent tensionată de războaie tarifare și blocaje în lanțurile de aprovizionare cu materii prime, iar Rusia rămâne concentrată pe teatrul ucrainean, niciuna dintre ele nu își poate permite căderea Teheranului. Un colaps al Iranului ar reprezenta un șah-mat definitiv împotriva podului terestru eurasiatic.

For the time being, the EU appears to be little more than a set of promises in economic terms, under the scepter of a bureaucracy that does not seem prepared to face the major geopolitical challenges ahead.

However, we should be fair and acknowledge that the EU does, from time to time, display certain “geopolitical flashes”, which are quickly dissipated in struggles for supremacy within the supranational Brussels bureaucracy. Among these flashes we may mention the idea of a common European army – an idea firmly opposed by the United States, as it would clearly lead to a divergence in the geopolitical destinies of Europeans and Americans – or the idea of opening relations with Russia, which France and Germany have, in fact, pursued. The recent example of the Nord Stream gas pipeline is more than telling. Beyond these elements, however, the European continent remains divided – not only by the hegemonic powers that ought to work toward its unity, but also for reasons related to Europe’s internal structure, including the Russian world or the space of the former USSR, as a result of the recent history of the postwar period.

The current European Union is, in essence, the product of the defeat of that *Fränkisch Europa* (French Europe) following the “unnatural” American–Russian cohabitation during the Second World War. This cohabitation led to the emergence of the Iron Curtain, the division of Europe, and, even more gravely, the alienation of the peoples of Southeastern Europe from Moscow.

After Hitler’s adventure of a purely German, anti-Russian Europe ended with the defeat of the Third Reich, Europe was traversed by two entirely different currents of opinion and will. While the Westerners, dominated by American influence, looked toward Moscow as a possible ally for a future unified Europe – in the manner of de Gaulle, who would have gladly replaced American tutelage with a Moscow friendship, in the sense of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis—the Easterners, disturbed by the geopolitical pressure of the USSR, simply wished to throw themselves into the arms of an American-Western European mirage, painted in the vivid colors of prosperity and perfect democracy. Even today, this mirage has not exhausted its

În consecință, ne apropiem de un «prag minim de credibilitate». Pentru a-și menține statutul de contraponderi viabile la Occident, Moscova și Beijingul trebuie, în cele din urmă, să reducă diferența dintre sprijinirea rezistenței iraniene și protejarea ei activă. Nefăcând acest «pas suplimentar», ele nu doar că ar ceda Orientul Mijlociu hegemoniei occidentale, dar ar transmite restului lumii că umbrela de securitate ruso-chineză este pur tranzacțională și lipsită de fermitatea necesară unei confruntări directe.

Loviturile din 2026 asupra Iranului marchează mai mult decât o simplă escaladare regională; ele amenință arhitectura fundamentală a unei Eurasii multipolare.

Deși unii analiști interpretează lipsa unei intervenții militare directe din partea Rusiei sau Chinei drept abandon, această interpretare ignoră o realitate strategică mai profundă. Moscova și Beijingul au trecut de la statutul de parteneri diplomați la cel de «ancore tehnologice». Totuși, conflictul a ajuns într-un moment critic în care sprijinul pasiv continuu riscă să fie interpretat drept paralizie strategică.

Prin urmare, Moscova și Beijingul trebuie să depășească simpla evitare a riscurilor și să își calibreze cu rigurozitate următoarea fază de escaladare pentru a evita prăbușirea totală a credibilității lor regionale”, in Silvia Boltuc, „Cum susține tehnologia rusă și chineză profunzimea strategică a Iranului” [“How Russian and Chinese Technology Supports Iran’s Strategic Depth”], in *Estica*, March 6, 2026, Available at: <https://www.estica.ro/article/cumsustinetehnologiarusasichinezaprofunzimea-strategica-a-iranului/>, Accessed on March 12, 2026.

appeal, three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but tensions within the NATO alliance, visible in recent years, have now taken on dramatic dimensions. Just these days, the American president is accusing European NATO allies (including the United Kingdom...) of betrayal, due to their passivity in participating in the U.S. war effort in the Gulf⁵⁹.

Perceiving, even before the changes of 1989, this deadlock in Europe – indeed, this apparently inexorable fate of disunity – the geopolitician Jean Thiriart asserted that a Fourth Reich was no longer possible, instead announcing the eventual emergence of a united Europe, a combination of Western Europe and the USSR. Thiriart, whose entirely unorthodox thinking – unbound by conventional labels – could shock, was also a critic of the idea of a confederal Europe, in which each state would retain its sovereignty, in the manner envisioned by Charles de Gaulle. Yet de Gaulle, despite his merits, is an ancestor of today's unified Franco-German duo, rather hostile to the Eastern periphery (de Gaulle famously said that Europe means France and Germany, and the rest of the states are “vegetables” – this mindset contributed to the disastrous fate of Hitler's European adventure; it also led Haushofer, otherwise a great geopolitician, to regard Italy as a second-rate country, incapable of comparison with the northern states – a source, one might say, of Salvinian revolt at the EU level, etc., etc.).

If the powerful Western states sometimes view Eastern or Southern Europe critically, and Russia with considerable indulgence – inviting it, naturally, to be a partner in the process of emancipation from American tutelage – the states that were themselves under Moscow's tutelage are far more hesitant about this project, feeling somewhat threatened (a sentiment, it must be said, stoked from the American side!) by Russia's return to the European or global geopolitical game.

Thus, a united Europe – or what we might call the “Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis” – must contend with the anti-Russian sentiments of Eastern Europe and with the challenge of balancing and redistributing the EU's shared economic resources. In a Europe economically dominated either by Germany and its zone of influence, or by France and Germany together⁶⁰, it is difficult to claim the full consensus of those who do not share equally in the benefits of the European common project.

⁵⁹ Agerpres Editorial Staff, „Donald Trump: NATO, «un tigru de hârtie fără SUA»; aliații din NATO, «lași»” [“Donald Trump: NATO, ‘a paper tiger without the U.S.’; NATO allies, ‘cowards’”], in *Agerpres*, March 20, 2026, Available at: <https://agerpres.ro/politicextern/2026/03/20/donald-trump-nato-un-tigru-de-hartie-fara-sua-aliatii-din-nato-lasi--1539621>, Accessed on March 20, 2026.

⁶⁰ It should be noted, in passing, that not all commentators agree on the solidity of the so-called “Franco-German couple”. Recently, the French philosopher Alain de Benoist questioned this geopolitical alliance, subtly accusing Germany of flirting with the U.S. It is worth mentioning that Alain de Benoist advocates for a special relationship between Europe – and particularly France – and Russia, and he criticizes American “imperialism” and the excessive geopolitical influence of the U.S. in Europe: Alain de Benoist, “Le ‘couple franco-allemand’ est un mythe!” [“The ‘Franco-German partnership’ is a myth!”], in *Bvoltaire*, June 13, 2019, Available at: <https://www.bvoltaire.fr/alain-de-benoist-le-couple-franco-allemand-est-un-mythe/>, Accessed on February 20, 2026.

The problem is historical in nature. In the interwar period, taking Romania as a case in point, the process of “accepting” German domination of Europe went through dramatic phases. Romania suffered from the economic “exploitation” of the German center relative to the resource-supplying Eastern periphery. The great Romanian economist Mihail Manoilescu built his entire economic theory on highlighting the necessity of relatively eliminating the economic potential differences between center and periphery through political will, so that the periphery could withstand the center. Although a convinced supporter of a united Europe (Manoilescu was friends with Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, whose ideas he believed in), the Romanian economist wrote at the time, in response to German promises that the periphery would not be neglected by Europe’s German industrial center:

“Nor can we deny that such a plan is possible and achievable. But is it enough to simply draw up plans in order to change the world? We, the peasants of the Danube, remain skeptical. Over the centuries, we have learned not to trust even what we see with our own eyes, let alone simple promises”⁶¹.

This issue will soon arise with regard to Russia as well – a country with enormous resources and significant economic potential, but which suffers from low economic efficiency. Recently, an economic agreement between Germany and Russia, apparently unprecedented in scope, called the “Agreement on Deepened Economic Cooperation”, was signed on June 7 during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, signaling a new period of openness in German–Russian relations. But will Russia not feel “colonized” by the penetration power of German capital, such that this agreement – heralded as a major victory and a sign of cooperation between the two countries – could eventually become an apple of discord between Western technology and Eastern resources? The European Union will have to pass this test as well as many others that we will not have time to explore here.

Turning again to the most pressing current reality after 2022, when American sanctions on Russia forced Europe to seek alternative sources of oil and gas outside of Russia, today, after a period in which the U.S. increased its sales of liquefied gas to the EU, there is a noticeable tendency to return to Europe’s old energy “ally”, Russia. Specialized press reports indicate that the EU purchased everything available in liquefied gas from the Yamal Arctic extraction, with an almost laughable justification:

“February figures tell a harsh story. Every shipment from Yamal went to Europe. Russia had no alternative clients and remained completely dependent on access to EU ports”, said Sebastian Rötters, a sanctions activist at Urgewald. Remarkably,

⁶¹ „Nici noi nu putem contesta că un asemenea plan este posibil și realizabil. Dar este suficient oare să stabilești planuri pentru ca să poți schimba lumea? Noi, țărani de la Dunăre, suntem neîncrezători. În decursul secolelor am învățat că nu trebuie să ne încredem nici măcar în ce vedem cu ochii noștri, cu atât mai puțin să ne încredem în simple promisiuni”, in Mihail Manoilescu, „În chestiunea industrializării țărilor agricole” [“On the issue of the industrialization of agricultural countries”], in „Lumea nouă” [“The New World”], No. 11-12/1938, p. 241.

zero shipments were delivered to China or other Asian markets, compared with four shipments sent to Asia in February 2025”⁶².

3. EUROPE AND “AMERICAN COLONIZATION”

The project of a united Europe suffers from what seems to be a fixed idea, endlessly waved by Western Europe: Europe is colonized by the U.S., Europe is vassalized by the U.S., etc. The critical register against America, of course, conceals definite European interests – again, within what we have called the “Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis” (to which Rome can be added, depending on context, also interested in good relations with Moscow) – but it is also a real mindset, rooted in the period at the end of the Second World War.

American intervention in Europe at the end of the last war was not perceived in Western Europe in the same way as it was in the East. On the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the Anglo-American landing in Normandy on June 6, 1944, a French website specializing in geopolitical analyses wrote bluntly: “D-Day, June 6, 1944: The American Empire Invades France”⁶³. The article, citing numerous significant historical references, describes how the American army bombed Norman towns without reason, causing approximately 20,000 civilian casualties; how American soldiers raped young French women; and how the Americans supposedly preferred to coexist with the Vichy regime – which had been sufficiently submissive to Hitler – rather than work with the far more patriotic de Gaulle. In other words, the image presented was entirely inverted from the naive historiographical narrative of France’s “liberation”.

This article is nothing more than a continuation of a mindset – an anti-Americanism that began with D-Day and persists today, in both scholarly and journalistic expressions.

From this perspective, a French author like Hervé Juvin represents the typically French reaction to what we have called the “colonization” of Europe by the U.S. In a series of works dedicated to the economic and geopolitical relations between Europe (with a focus on France) and the United States, Juvin – an economist by training, but also a politician engaged in the Gaullist-style patriotism of the Le Pen sphere – argues that, despite predictions suggesting an inevitable acceleration of American decline in recent times, in reality the U.S. still knows very well how to defend its global interests and maintain Europe under its tutelage. Naturally, such tutelage must disappear in

⁶² Malte Humpert, “EU Buys 100% of Russian Arctic LNG Just 9 Months Before Planned Gas Ban”, in *G Captain Daily*, March 9, 2026, Available at: https://gcaptain.com/eubuy100ofrussianarcticlngjust9monthsbeforeplannedgasban/?fbclid=IwY2xjawQs39JleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBzcnRjBmFwcF9pZBAyMjIwMzIxNzg4MjAwODkyAAEeIH9k0PANZhCRh4ppQdOdKw50EQf8aYoKTBxbHWkWnflgOSTM7TLC5PRsg28_aem_840DPZpOJilrJL72BswGUg, Accessed on March 9, 2026.

⁶³ Egalité et Réconciliation Editorial Staff, “D-Day, 6 juin 1944: l’Empire américain envahit la France” [“D-Day, June 6, 1944: The United States invades France”], in *Egalité et Réconciliation*, June 6, 2022, Available at: <https://www.egaliteetreconciliation.fr/DDay6juin1944lEmpireamericain-envahit-la-France-55014.html>, Accessed on March 5, 2026.

Juvin's view, where he aligns himself as a continuator of Charles de Gaulle. His tone is more than categorical: either the European Union becomes an independent geopolitical actor, casting off American tutelage and thus ensuring a balance of power among the world's major centers of strength (the U.S., China, Russia as a military actor), or it must be abandoned, because it fails to fulfill its mission:

“The hyperpower of America has not yet been ended. It remains our essential adversary, in the sense Mao Zedong gave to these words: the one who threatens the foundations of our existence. If Europe is not the means through which a balance of powers can be realized, if it is not the instrument to free us from a Westernism leading to a Third World War, according to the detestable neoconservative scheme ‘us against all’, France must exit a Union that destroys it and follow, alongside others, the path of resistance”⁶⁴.

Although he sometimes tempers his critique of American superpower, Juvin does not hesitate to highlight the failings of the current European Union: its geopolitical impotence; its excessive focus on human rights rhetoric and disintegrating individualism; its mimetic copying of the free-market mystique of Anglo-American origin; and its inability to effectively counter what he calls the “extraterritoriality of American law” – that is, the American tendency to extend U.S. jurisdiction over all economic (and geopolitical) processes within the dollar's sphere of influence, which gravely harms other geopolitical actors. A relatively recent example is the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran, which forced the EU to invent a sophisticated mechanism to circumvent American sanctions on that country. Reports of major European companies leaving the Iranian market under the threat of U.S. sanctions demonstrate the high stakes reached in the economic struggle among “Western partners”.

Hervé Juvin is a lucid thinker. He proposes a European construction defined within Europe itself, in an equal partnership with other geopolitical powers (without neglecting Russia), rather than in an obedient, submissive, or timid manner. He advocates, somewhat in a Third Worldist key, for liberation from the tutelage of the American global empire, for resistance, and for intellectual “arming” and struggle. But an interesting and important point: elected as a Member of the European Parliament in the last European elections on Marine Le Pen's party list, when speaking about Europe, Juvin places France first. In every European stance he takes, the French “national preference” is evident – natural, patriotic.

Somewhat in the same spirit and from similar positions, another French author, Ivan Blot, writes. The title of his book signals nothing cheerful: “*Europe Colonized*”.

⁶⁴ „Încă nu s-a pus capăt hiperputerii americane. Ea rămâne adversarul nostru esențial, în sensul în care Mao Zedong îl dădea acestor cuvinte: cel ce amenință fundamentele ființei noastre. Dacă Europa nu este mijlocul prin care să se realizeze un echilibru al puterilor, dacă nu este mijlocul de a ne elibera de un occidentalism care conduce la un al treilea război mondial, după detestabila schemă a neoconservatorilor, «noi împotriva tuturor», Franța trebuie să iasă dintr-o Uniune care o distruge și să urmeze, alături de ceilalți, altfel, calea rezistenței”, in Hervé Juvin, *Zidul de Vest nu a căzut [The Berlin Wall did not fall]*, Chișinău, Popular University Publishing House, 2017, p. 52.

This time, the author's preference for a strategic relationship with Russia becomes clearer, framed through the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis, which he states categorically:

“The Europe-Russia couple, with a Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis, is in fact highly complementary in energy and economic terms (...) The interests of this couple are increasingly diverging from American interests, and the latter are suffering the consequences (...) Economically, Europe and Russia are highly complementary, whereas the United States and Europe are competitors (...)

From an economic perspective, there are two major blocs: the European Union and the more recent Eurasian Union. Politically, there is no longer a total opposition between East and West, although American diplomacy sometimes artificially tries to reignite the Cold War”⁶⁵.

In the same work, Blot, a former MEP, describes the comedy of European parliamentarism: how “voting” takes place in the European Parliament, how the European Commission “makes and unmakes” all the games at the EU level, etc. It is an insider critique of the disastrous bureaucratism that suffocates the European body. The solution? Again, geopolitical in nature, but this time with a broader perspective, which Jean Thiriart would have applauded:

“(…) the Eurasianist axis is the axis of future growth: our most promising partners remain China and Russia, even India. This is why we should think of a ‘Great Europe’ of economic growth from Brest to Vladivostok, rather than today’s limited Europe, struggling for breath. Great Europe will respect national sovereignties. Russia’s presence will serve as a guarantee against any attempt at bureaucratic federalism and will rebalance Anglo-Saxon hegemony”⁶⁶.

4. HOW CHINA SEES EUROPE: EURASIA FROM EAST TO WEST AND BACK

Equally interesting is China's perspective on Europe. Although much more discreet in its expression, China sees the EU as a kind of natural extension of its geopolitical style, based on the ideas of multipolarity and peaceful cooperation.

⁶⁵ „Cuplul Europa-Rusia, cu o axă Paris-Berlin-Moscova, este de fapt foarte complementar în plan energetic și economic (...) Interesele acestui cuplu se îndepărtează din ce în ce mai mult de interesele americane, iar acestea din urmă suferă consecințele (...) Din punct de vedere economic, Europa și Rusia sunt foarte complementare, în timp ce Statele Unite și Europa sunt concurente (...)

Din punct de vedere economic, există două mari ansambluri, Uniunea Europeană și Uniunea Eurasiatică, mai recentă. Din punct de vedere politic, nu mai există o opoziție totală între Est și Vest, cu toate că diplomația americană încearcă artificial să reaprindă uneori războiul rece”, in Ivan Blot, *Europa colonizată [Colonized Europe]*, Chișinău, Popular University Publishing House, 2018, pp. 189-190.

⁶⁶ „(...) axa eurasiastică este cea a creșterii viitoare: partenerii noștri cei mai promițători rămân China și Rusia, chiar și India. Iată de ce ar trebui să ne gândim la o «Mare Europă» a creșterii economice de la Brest până la Vladivostok și nu la Europa limitată și cu răsufarea tăiată de astăzi. Această Mare Europă va respecta suveranitățile naționale. Prezența Rusiei va fi o garanție împotriva oricărei tentative de federalism birocrat și va reechilibra hegemonia anglo-saxonă”, in *Ibidem*, p. 48.

Recently, after January 2026, when the guidelines of Donald Trump's second term became clearer, relations between the EU and China experienced a noticeable push toward improvement⁶⁷. Even in Romania, this wave of rapprochement with the major Asian power was felt⁶⁸.

Even more intriguing are theoretical efforts to find in China a resonance of European sovereignty – the foundation of strategic autonomy, cultivated especially by France but not rejected by Germany – through a kind of Confucianist Gaullism:

“De Gaulle offered France everything Pétain claimed to offer – pride, sovereignty, national identity, the end of humiliation – but without collaboration, without racial laws, without deportations, without abandoning the soul. One path led to the shame that haunts France to this day, the other to liberation and renewal. Gaullism did not merely theorize a distinction from fascism – it defeated it on the ground when it mattered. If Europe needs proof that patriotism can be reclaimed from the hands of demons, the proof exists. It is not hypothetical. Gaullism already exists.

This is one of the great advantages of Gaullism: it is not a theoretical construct. It actually governed France for decades, has institutional memory, concrete historical achievements, texts and speeches that articulate its vision. It proved that it could work. And Gaullism does not wait to be revived – its central themes are alive and remain extraordinarily successful and relevant.

Many in the West today wonder whether they should emulate the ‘Chinese model’. But here is the immense irony: today’s China resembles De Gaulle’s France far more than current France resembles itself. The Chinese understood what works; Europe gave up.

Think about it: what is the ‘Chinese model’, really?

Obsession with sovereignty: checked!

A strong state that directs strategic industries, builds infrastructure, and creates national champions instead of letting the ‘market’ drain productive capacity: checked!

Long-term planning horizons, not quarterly capitalism: checked!

Formation of a meritocratic elite through rigorous examination systems (Gaokao and Party School in China; the grandes écoles and ENA under De Gaulle): checked!

Civilizational confidence without apology: checked!

The conviction that a people is real, has a character shaped over centuries, and deserves preservation: checked!

Non-negotiable strategic autonomy – the absolute refusal to outsource security or become dependent on a foreign power for anything existential: checked!

Checked, checked, checked, checked, checked, checked, checked!

Is it any wonder that the Chinese have boundless admiration for De Gaulle?

⁶⁷ China Briefing Editorial Staff, “EU-China Relations After the 2024 European Elections: A Timeline”, in *China Briefing*, April 20, 2026, Available at: <https://www.china-briefing.com/news/eu-china-relations-after-the-2024-european-elections-a-timeline/>, Accessed on April 25, 2026.

⁶⁸ Romanian Cri Editorial Staff, „Ministrul Florin Barbu: România are o relație specială cu Republica Populară Chineză” [“Minister Florin Barbu: Romania has a special relationship with the People’s Republic of China”], in *Romanian Cri*, March 20, 2026, Available at: <https://romanian.cri.cn/2026/03/20/ARTI1774006904393951>, Accessed on March 22, 2026.

When De Gaulle died in November 1970, a day of mourning was declared across China – right in the midst of the Cultural Revolution! – something that had never happened for a Western leader and has never happened since. Mao himself personally expressed his condolences in a telegram to Madame De Gaulle, the only known written communication in which Mao expressed his unreserved admiration for a Western leader.

Guo Moruo – a famous Chinese author and at that time Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress – said after De Gaulle’s death, at a reception at the French embassy:

‘General De Gaulle is no more. But only his body is dead. His spirit remains alive. For the ideas he defended and embodied cannot die. I raise my glass to the immortality of General De Gaulle’s spirit!’

Truly extraordinary words from a high-ranking Chinese Communist official about a ‘capitalist’ Western leader, especially during Mao’s era.

To this day, the Chinese ambassador to France regularly lays flowers at De Gaulle’s tomb in the small rural village of Colombey-les-Deux-Églises, in the Haute-Marne department. When China wants to honor a relationship, it does not go to the Élysée or Brussels, but to the tomb of the only French leader who treated China as a sovereign nation treats another sovereign nation: with independence, respect, and refusal to seek Washington’s permission. This is what China honors – not sentimentality, but sovereignty. They recognize and admire this quality because they possess it themselves. And without doubt, as they lay flowers on that grave, they ask themselves: what happened to Europe that once produced such men?”⁶⁹.

⁶⁹ „De Gaulle i-a oferit Franței tot ceea ce Pétain pretindea că oferă – mândrie, suveranitate, identitate națională, sfârșitul umilinței – dar fără colaborare, fără legi rasiale, fără deportări, fără abandonarea sufletului. Un drum a dus la rușinea care bântuie Franța până în ziua de azi, celălalt la eliberare și reînnoire. Gaullismul nu s-a limitat la a teoretiza o distincție față de fascism – l-a învins, pe teren, atunci când a contat. Dacă Europa are nevoie de dovada că patriotismul poate fi recuperat din mâinile demonilor, dovada există. Nu este ipotetică.

Gaullismul există deja.

Acesta este unul dintre marile avantaje ale gaullismului: nu este o construcție teoretică, ci a guvernat Franța timp de decenii, are memorie instituțională, realizări istorice concrete, texte și discursuri care îi articulează viziunea. A demonstrat că poate funcționa.

Și gaullismul nu așteaptă să fie reinviat – temele sale centrale sunt vii și încă extraordinar de de succes și relevante.

Mulți din Occident se întrebă astăzi dacă nu ar trebui să emuleze «modelul chinez». Dar iată imensa ironie: China de astăzi seamănă mult mai mult cu Franța lui De Gaulle decât seamănă Franța actuală cu ea însăși. Chinezii au înțeles ce funcționează, Europa a renunțat.

Gândește-te: despre ce este, de fapt, «modelul chinez»?

Obsesia pentru suveranitate: bifat!

Un stat puternic care direcționează industriile strategice, construiește infrastructură și creează campioni naționali, în loc să lase «piața» să golească capacitatea productivă: bifat!

Orizonturi de planificare pe termen lung, nu capitalism trimestrial: bifat!

Formarea unei elite meritocratice prin sisteme riguroase de examinare (Gaokao și Școala de Partid în China, marile școli și ENA la De Gaulle): bifat!

Încredere civilizațională fără scuze: bifat!

Convingerea că un popor este real, are un caracter format de-a lungul secolelor și merită păstrat: bifat!

5. TOO MUCH EU OR TOO MUCH SOVEREIGN STATE? THE KEYS TO EU POWER

We must note that, regarding the EU, there exists a perfectly symmetrical critique – this time from the side of European federalists – who argue that the EU is not too powerful compared to nation-states; on the contrary, it is merely their puppet. This viewpoint is supported, among others, by a well-known commentator for the French liberal newspaper *Libération*, Jean Quatremer. The problem of the European Union, according to Quatremer (longtime correspondent to European institutions for the newspaper), is that it is nothing... but an emanation of the national states.

He points out, for example, that the EU's legislative contribution is not 80%, but only 20% on average, and this share tends to decrease. In conclusion, Quatremer believes (author of a book dedicated to this issue with the provocative title *Les salauds de l'Europe. Guide à l'usage des eurosceptiques* – Calmann-Lévy, 2017, *The Bastards of Europe: A Guide for Eurosceptics*) that the states tend to “throw” failures onto the EU while pocketing the successes for themselves.

The same desire to increase the EU's weight relative to national states, this time with a special ideological arsenal linked to Europe's pre-Christian roots, is found in the “Party of Europeans”, which dreams of nothing less than a single European citizenship, a unitary European state with a strategic reorientation toward Russia, the dissolution of

Autonomie strategică nenegociabilă – refuzul absolut de a externaliza securitatea sau de a deveni dependent de o putere străină pentru orice lucru existențial: bifat!

Bifat, bifat, bifat, bifat, bifat, bifat, bifat!

Este de mirare că chinezii au o admirație fără margini pentru De Gaulle?

Când De Gaulle a murit, în noiembrie 1970, a fost declarată o zi de doliu în întreaga Chină – în plină Revoluție Culturală! – lucru care nu se mai întâmplase niciodată pentru un lider occidental și nu s-a mai întâmplat de atunci. Mao însuși și-a exprimat personal condoleanțele într-o telegramă adresată doamnei De Gaulle, singura comunicare scrisă cunoscută în care Mao și-a exprimat admirația fără rezerve pentru un lider occidental.

Guo Moruo – un autor chinez celebru și, la acea vreme, vicepreședinte al Comitetului Permanent al Congresului Național al Poporului – a spus după moartea lui De Gaulle, în timpul unei recepții la ambasada Franței: «Generalul De Gaulle nu mai este. Dar doar trupul său este mort. Spiritul său rămâne viu. Pentru că ideile pe care le-a apărât și întruchipat nu pot muri. Ridic paharul pentru nemurirea spiritului generalului De Gaulle!». Cuvinte cu adevărat extraordinare pentru un înalt oficial comunist chinez despre un lider occidental «capitalist», cu atât mai mult în epoca lui Mao.

Până în ziua de azi, ambasadorul Chinei în Franța merge în mod regulat să depună flori în mormântul lui De Gaulle din micul sat rural Colombey-les-Deux-Églises, din departamentul Haute-Marne. Atunci când China vrea să celebreze relația, nu merge la Élysée, nici la Bruxelles, ci la mormântul singurului lider francez care a tratat China așa cum o națiune suverană tratează o altă națiune suverană: cu independență, respect și refuzul de a cere permisiunea Washingtonului. Aceasta este ceea ce onorează China – nu sentimentalismul, ci suveranitatea. Ei recunosc și admiră această calitate pentru că o posedă ei înșiși. Și, fără îndoială, se întrebă, în timp ce depun flori pe acel mormânt, ce s-a întâmplat cu Europa care a produs odinioară astfel de oameni”, în Arnaud Bertrand, „Poate gaullismul să devină confucianismul Europei?” [“Could Gaullism become the Confucianism of Europe?”], in *Estica*, January 16, 2026, Available at: <https://www.estica.ro/article/poategaullismulsadevinaconfucianismul-europei/>, Accessed on March 10, 2026.

NATO, the creation of a European army⁷⁰ that would ultimately integrate Russia's army (sic!), the elimination of all unelected European institutions, and respect for European diversity (with special reference to the Eastern European states that fear Russia and display a well-founded Russophobia – the Baltic states in particular). In the vision of the project's proponent, Thomas Ferrier, this would be the "New Athens"⁷¹.

Extremely ambitious projects! In truth, Europe has never lacked visionaries...

And yet! Europe is such a closed "club" that it sometimes sends shivers down the spine and produces a sense of helplessness in those seeking to uncover the secrets of power. One of the seekers of the true keys to current European power, former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis, confesses in a book titled *Adults in Conversation: Behind the Secret Corridors of Europe* his experience with the Eurogroup, the EU's famous financial brain. Varoufakis describes how European officials simply lie, how you cannot rely on them, and how decisions made behind the scenes are not reflected at all in the official statements released at the end of meetings. Everything has the aspect of a perfectly opaque conclave, with officials obeying a parallel, silent, and implacable hierarchy. The abstruse nature of major financial decisions at the EU level is difficult to bear. Regarding the Eurogroup, which decides everything financially at the European level, the Greek minister writes:

"European treaties confer no legal status on it, yet this constituted body makes the most important decisions for Europe. Most Europeans, including politicians, do not know exactly what the Eurogroup is or how it functions"⁷².

These realities make the economic and financial influence struggles at the EU's real decision-making centers far more important than the publicly declared "European construction". Under such conditions, what can one expect from a body parasitized by its own financial and economic egotism?

⁷⁰ Plans to create a European army aimed at ensuring Europe's strategic independence are primarily promoted by Paris. Recently, a new initiative in the series of efforts to establish a European defense unit took place: the signing of a framework agreement between France, Germany, and Spain for the development of a European stealth aircraft by 2040: Teodora Ion, „«O zi mare pentru uniunea de apărare europeană». Franța, Germania și Spania au semnat un acord – cadru pentru construirea unui avion «invizibil» european până în 2040” [“A big day for European defense cooperation”. France, Germany, and Spain have signed a framework agreement to build a European ‘stealth’ aircraft by 2040”], in *Calea Europeană*, June 17, 2019, Available at: <https://www.caleaeuropeana.ro/o-zi-mare-pentru-uniunea-de-aparare-europeana-franta-germania-sispania-au-semnat-un-acord-cadru-pentru-construireaunuiavioninvizibileuropean-pana-i/>, Accessed on January 27, 2026.

⁷¹ The ideas of Thomas Ferrier, who is, moreover, a very knowledgeable observer of the political life in all EU states, can be found here: Thomas Ferrier, “Manifeste pour une vraie renaissance européenne” [“The manifest for a true European renaissance”], March 6, 2019 Available at: <http://thomasferrier.hautetfort.com/archive/2019/03/06/manifestepourunevraierenaissanceeuropeenne-6133866.html>. Accessed on January 27, 2026.

⁷² Yanis Varoufakis, *Conversation entre adultes. Dans les coulisses secrètes de l'Europe [Conversation Among Adults: Behind the Scenes in Europe]*, Éditions *Les liens qui libèrent*, 2017, p. 237, quoted by Georges Feltrin-Tracol, “À quoi bon l'Union européenne?” [“What's the point of the EU?”], Available at: <http://euosynergies.hautetfort.com/archive/2019/05/28/georges-feltrin-tracol-a-quoi-bon-l-union-europeenne.html>, Accessed on January 27, 2026.

6. ROMANIA'S PLACE IN THE EU, YESTERDAY AND TODAY

As a conclusion, it is important to mention what Romania's current and future place might be in this highly turbulent European Union.

In recent times, Romania has attempted a double game, in line with its limited negotiating capacity, between the EU – ever more detached from the U.S. – and its “strategic” American partner. This strategy was motivated by the at least questionable behavior of major European interest groups (banks, transnational corporations) toward Romania. Discourse on sovereignty, on double economic standards, or on combating the excesses of Western corporations operating in Romania has predominated in recent years, but only until the pandemic and the war in Ukraine.

Somewhat in the manner of Matteo Salvini's Italy, Romania initially positioned itself along an ad-hoc axis, Washington-Tel Aviv (or at least tried to signal in that direction), in order to gain more bargaining power relative to Brussels. However, the 2019 European Parliament elections showed that Romanians are not yet ready for a fully sovereigntist discourse. Either they do not face the real problems of Italy – suffocated by immigration mainly caused by Berlin and Paris's permissiveness toward those crossing the Mediterranean to reach Europe – or they fear the increasingly restless specter of Russia's return to the region. Romania, through its elite, preferred to sit more quietly in the Brussels boat.

Indeed, to continue the comparison with Italy, Salvini himself was criticized at home, with his “sovereignism” toward Brussels interpreted as mere desertion into the American camp: “Sovereignism without sovereignty”, headlined a well-known Italian geopolitics magazine defending the Eurasianist stronghold (and Europeanism) against American thalassocratic power⁷³.

In Romania, initially, no one criticized the older sovereigntist currents (PSD-ALDE) or the newer ones (AUR) for their at least apparent alignment with American, non-European interests. But it is predictable that as Europe asserts itself in the Eastern European periphery – including by drawing Russia into this unprecedented condominium – more critical voices toward American recipes (defense being by far the most sensitive area) will emerge, creating conditions for Romania to “commit” to the new strategic direction⁷⁴.

Currently, the SAFE program – a European-specific military armament initiative – although criticized by the domestic sovereigntist public, appears to be an option Romania is connected to. What a few years ago was hard to imagine is today

⁷³ Daniele Perra, “Soveranismo senza sovrانيتa: il caso salvini” [“Sovereignty without sovereign power: the Salvini case”], in *Eurasia*, June 18, 2019. Available at: <https://www.eurasia-rivista.com/sovrانيتo-senza-sovrانيتa-il-caso-salvini/>, Accessed on January 26, 2026.

⁷⁴ There are signals, so far only in the press, that Romania should not neglect European strategic elements, such as the future stealth aircraft: Cristian Unteanu, „Primul mare proiect în cadrul «autonomiei strategice europene». România are măcar o părere?” [“The first major project under ‘European strategic autonomy’. Does Romania even have an opinion on this?”], in *Adevărul*, June 18, 2019. Available at: https://adevarul.ro/international/europa/primul-mare-proiectcadrulautonomieistrategiceeuropene-romania-macar-parerep-1_5d088736892c0bb0c680cc5c/index.html, Accessed on January 27, 2026.

“heard” as a possible scenario: namely, replacing the American nuclear umbrella in Europe with a French one⁷⁵.

In this article, written – as mentioned – in two stages over six years, we have tried to highlight some elements related to the heavy geopolitical trends of the European and Eurasian continents and their relations with the U.S., while also drawing attention to specific signals of present and future directions, which in turn reveal older trends that have yet to fully manifest. The fog of the 2022 war in Ukraine, and events such as the U.S.-Iran conflict of 2025 and 2026, are dramatic circumstances that obscure a clear view of these trends.

Nonetheless, the author’s intuition (accepting the obvious risk of being contradicted by future events) is that the process of Eurasian unification, once begun, will continue. These lines are merely an introduction and an invitation to observe and follow this process. Clearly, the history being written before our eyes requires more chroniclers to be properly captured. We acknowledge that our limited resources may not have allowed us to be fully convincing – but we hope that our readers have been “alerted” by these pages to seek out on their own, other perspectives on the subject.

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⁷⁵ For more information see: https://www.mapn.ro/programul_safe/index.php, and for the French nuclear umbrella, see, among others: Euronews Editorial Staff, „Ce înseamnă «umbrela nucleară» a Franței și cum ar putea funcționa pentru Europa” [“What is France’s ‘nuclear umbrella’ and how might it work for Europe?”], in *Euronews*, March 5, 2026, Available at: <https://www.euronews.ro/articole/ce-inseamna-umbrela-nuclearafrantei-si-cum-ar-putea-functiona-pentru-europa>, Accessed on March 10, 2026.

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